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Summary:This paper presents a framework for the dyadic study of inter-firm innovation 
cooperation, beyond the boundaries of collaborative innovation projects. In order to 
understand how two firms can maximizethe performance of their relationship, we performed a 
literature review combined with interviews with practitioners. The result of this study is 
amodel associated with propositions on the interactions between its different elements, which 
are (i) the governance of the relationship, (ii) its performance, (iii) its level of development 
and (iv) the degree of innovation of the collaborative projects. This paper concludes by 
suggesting future researches and stating implications for managers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last thirty years, innovation cooperation between firms has experienced tremendous 
growth (Van de Vrande, de Jong, Vanhaverbekeand de Rochemont, 2009). In a context where 
the need for innovation continuously increases and where companies are more and more 
concentrating on their core businesses, independent firms are engaging in innovation 
cooperation in order to strengthen their competitiveness (Le Dain, Calvi and Cheriti, 2011). 
These types of inter-firmcollaboration are mainly achieved through the implementation of 
innovation projects or programsjointly undertaken by two firms. Because of the proliferation 
of outsourcing innovation, it is highly probable that the relationship between two companies 
involved in such a project will go beyond that one project, with such probability increasing in 
areas where innovation capabilities are rarer. 
However, the success of an innovation project does not presume the success of the 
cooperation relationship. Conversely, an innovation program that failsmay not necessarily 
negatively affect the performance of the cooperation relationship and its continuation. Indeed, 
the performance of an innovation cooperation relationship is not limited to the success of each 
joint project or program of a dyad; it is also derived from the development of innovationand 
collaboration capabilities specific to both cooperating firms. 
The performance of inter-firmrelationship focused on innovation is characterized by the 
development of new knowledge that increases and expands the realm of targeted innovations 
for the two firms as well as increases their ability to work together; this knowledgearising 
from the information exchanges within the dyad. This performance is also characterized by 
the development of a competitive advantage unique to the dyad: the relational rent which 
represents the mutual capacity to understand the other, anticipate the other’s needs and 
respond to them, beyond the initial commitments (Dyer and Singh, 1998). As such, 
theperformance of the innovation cooperation relies on the quality of interactions and on the 
capacity of the organizations to adapt to one another over time (Doz, 1996). 
In our paper, we are looking at the mechanisms and factors that contribute to the performance 
of inter-firminnovation cooperation, along the course of the development of the relationship. 
To do this, we utilized literature on inter-firm relations, both in the fields of strategic alliances 
and customer-supplier relationships, as well as literature on Open Innovation. We relied upon 
the theory of transaction costs and upon the resource-based view, which includes the 
knowledge based view (Grant, 1996). 
We also adopted the interaction model applied to dyads as proposed by the IMP group 
(Håkansson and IMP Project Group, 1982). Relying on interviews with practitioners, we 
developed a framework to study the development and functioning of dyadic inter-firm 
cooperation in the joint undertaking of innovation projects or programs, over the course of 
their relationship, and the resulting effect on the performance of the relationship. 
In order to answer our research questions "how governance mechanisms, during the 
development of a relationship, impact the performance of cooperation for innovation? And, 
what impacts these governance mechanisms?” we begin by clarifying the theoretical 
framework of inter-firmrelationships and collaborative innovation. We then present our 
research method.Next, we present our conceptual model and our propositions. We conclude 
by discussing the managerial implications of the results of our work and delineate further 
research directions. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK 
LITERATURE RELATED TO INNOVATION COOPERATION 
Research on inter-firm relationship relies on the distinction between discrete transactions and 
relational exchanges. It suggests that inter-firm cooperation belongs to the latter category 
because it“traces to previous agreements; exchange [and] is longer in duration, reflecting an 
ongoing process [with] joint efforts related to both performance and planning over time” 
(Dwyer, Schurrand Oh, 1987). 
Many researchers have studied the characteristics of the relationship between firms. They are 
interested in both the organizational forms it can take (Kale and Singh, 2009; Takeishi, 
2001)and the relationship between interorganizational interactions and the atmosphere of this 
relationship (Håkansson and IMP Project Group, 1982) – withinter-firm trust being the main 
studied element of the atmosphere (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Zaheer, McEvilyand Perrone, 
1998). In addition, since the mid-1970s, under the leadership of the IMP group, the study of 
inter-firm relationship, which had,until then, been conducted from the point of view of a mere 
protagonist, began to be conducted through a dyadic approach(Håkansson and IMP Project 
Group, 1982; Håkansson and Snehota, 1995). 
Innovation within inter-firm cooperation is addressed through three overlapping streams of 
strategy and relationship marketing research:(i) the study of R&D alliances and technology 
partnerships, (ii)Open Innovation and (iii) the study of supplier involvement in new product 
development (ESI in NPD). The first of theseaddresses theinter-firm relationship through the 
pooling oftechnological resources and the way the firms govern it; with a focus on research 
and development activities. Open Innovation enlarge the focus on R&D activities to the 
implementation of innovation, but adopts the perspective of a major player, considering the 
joint innovation project to be inbound or outbound (Huizingh, 2011).Finally, if the literature 
on early supplier involvement in NPD may adopt a dyadic approach (Le Dain et al., 2011), the 
study of the relationship is analyzed in the context of a single project or program innovation. 
Therefore, our study attempts to contribute to this literature by proposing to study innovation 
cooperationbetween two firms(i) including all activities beyond R&D, (ii) adopting a dyadic 
perspective and (iii) considering the relationship beyond the innovation project. 
THEORETICALBACKGROUND RELATED TO INTER-FIRM RELATIONSHIP 
In order to discuss innovation cooperation two theoretical streams provide the common 
conceptual basis for the above researches: Resource Based View (RBV) especially the 
knowledge-based view, and transaction cost economics (TCE). The works from the IMP 
group provides the perspectives for a dyadic approach of the research. 
RBV based arguments propose that resources that grant a sustainable competitive advantage 
to a firm are rare, valuable, non-imitable and not substitutable. Resources includes the assets 
of a company and also its processes and routines (Sluyts, Matthyssens, Martensand Streukens, 
2011). The combination of a firm’s resources with external complementary resources allows 
the firm to develop and reach new potential resources. Thus, two firms will be keen to 
cooperate to develop a competitive advantage through the pooling their respective resources. 
More precisely, the Knowledge Based View, presented by Grant (Grant, 1996), proposes to 
explain the building of these new resources through knowledge transfers that occur at both 
intra and inter-firm levels. 
Therefore, the mechanisms that enablea firm to learn from the other firm and from its own 
experiences, in other words, to capture knowledge and apply it, are central for value creation 
in a business relationship. It is even more important when the relationship is about innovation, 
in which case the relationship is focused on knowledge transfers between the firms and within 
them (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Hatchuel, 1999; Huizingh, 2011). 
Cost transaction economics (TCE) provides another conceptual lens for the economic picture 
of the cooperation relationship. According to TCE, in order to achieve a given goal, a 
company evaluates a priori the costs of available options, both internally and externally 
(Williamson, 1975). The estimated costs are those which are related to the achievement of the 
goal, including those related to uncertainty reduction, as well as those which take into account 
the potential opportunistic behaviors of cooperating firms. This assessment allows a firm to 
determine the extent to which theycan rely on internal and external sources for a given 
objective (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). 
Within the field of research on relational marketing, however, TCE is recognized as not being 
able to describe the relationships between companies because it remains focused on discrete 
transactions and does not take into account the impact of repeated interactions between two 
companies (Gulati, 1995).Nonetheless, TCE provides an approach that allows to identification 
and analysis of the changes that occur within such a relationship (Gulati, Lawrence and 
Puranam, 2005). These changes are considered as mechanisms that safeguard the achievement 
of the cooperating firms’ goals, taking into considerationthe potential opportunistic behaviors 
from the one or the other firm. 
In the examination of the innovation cooperation relationship, the RBV and TCE theories are 
worthwhile tools for the understanding of the tensions between the building of new resources, 
the knowledge exchanges, and the defense of the individual interests of the firms for which 
the cooperation payoff might exceed that of solo endeavors. This tension can be expressed 
within the governance mechanisms that are put in place by each firm and at their interface to 
manage the relationship. 
Lastly, the dyadic perspective proposed by the IMP group offers a customer-supplier 
relationship approach by providing a global overview of the relationship. The interaction 
model of the IMP group proposes to describe the relationship as comprised of (1) the elements 
and processes of interaction, (2) the participants in the interaction process, (3) the atmosphere 
affecting and affected by the interaction and (4) the environment within which interaction 
takes place (Håkansson and IMP Project Group, 1982). Thus it addresses the relationship by 
integrating the perspective of each of the cooperating companies. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Our research followed an abductive approach: we performed data collection and analysis in 
conjunction with a search for complementary theories, constantly seeking to deepen our 
understanding of theories and data throughout the process (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). 
The data collection was conducted through 35 in-depth interviews from 2011-2012 in several 
industries with French company stakeholders and institutional actors involved in inter-firm 
innovation cooperation. There were 15 purchasing or partnership managers in large firms, 8 
top managers of small firms, 5 governmental agents and 7 managers of company clusters. 4 
governmental agents were in charge of developing French industry through public financing 
and control of collaborative innovation projects, and 1 was in charge of improving inter-firm 
relationships in France. The role of company clusters was to conduct joint lobbying actions 
and to develop innovation and industrial collaborations. Some firms’ managers were also 
implicated in clusters with management position. The interviews were conducted with a series 
of open questions and discussion topics that allowed respondents to raise issues that were not 
necessarily covered (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2010). The interviews lasted an average of an 
hour and a half andhave been noted and transcribed. 
As a parallel, we relied on the literature on inter-firm relations to characterize the relational 
exchange, its mechanisms and its development. Successive versions of the model were 
recorded in research notebooks, both paper and electronic. The data collected with the 
practitioners was confronted to the theories. Regularly, some cases resulted in paradoxes and 
contradictions that led us to change our perception by attempting to reconcile them 
(Eisenhardt, 1989),leading us to amend our attempts to describe the phenomena, but also to 
leave open questions forlater investigation. The model was revised until saturation (Dumez, 
2004). 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR INNOVATION COOPERATION AND 
PROPOSITIONS 
Based upon our literature review and the dataanalysis of our interviews with practitioners, we 
propose the following framework (Figure 1) that points out four interconnected sets described 
below and formulate six propositions. 
 
RELATIONSHIP GOVERNANCE 
The relationship governance of an innovation cooperation refers to the set of mechanisms that 
ensure and regulate the interactions within the relationship and the elements being exchanged 
that are (i) product or service, (ii) information, (iii) financial and (iv) social exchanges 
(Håkansson and IMP Project Group, 1982). These exchanges occur partly under the rules of 
formal contractual arrangements and partly through the relational mechanisms related to 
interactions within and between organizations (i.e. processes, tasks, tools and routines). 
- Contractual governance 
The contractual governance defines the legal realm of the relationship through a formal 
frameworkin which the cooperating firms mutually agree on their expectations, rights and 
obligations (Kale and Singh, 2009; MacNeil, 1980; Reuer and Ariño, 2007). The contracts are 
formed in order to protect the relationship against opportunistic behaviours through (1) 
safeguard provisions, and to fix the distribution of inputs and outputs of each organization 
through (2) sharing provisions. 
(1) The safeguard provisionsenable the reduction of uncertainties linkedto 
opportunistic behavior by giving each party the ability to impose its will on the other 
without his consent (MacNeil, 1980; Williamson, 1975). It is such provisionsthat 
specify the resolution of potential disputes and that limit information disclosures. The 
risk of sanctions has a positive effect on the relationship, on the one hand by forcing 
companies cooperating to stay focused on their common objectives, and secondly by 
establishing “deterrence-based trust”in the relationship (Gulati, 1995). 
In the context of repeated links in a cooperative relationship, these provisions are 
adapted to the perceived state of the atmosphere by each member of the dyad (Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1994). If the provisions have a positive impact on the performance of 
the relationship when their coercive effect is established at a low level, they 
conversely become counterproductive from the point at which their coercive influence 
is perceived as high (Hausman and Johnston, 2010). 
(2) The sharing provisionsconsist of defining the respective inputsof each 
cooperating firm and the rules for sharing the outputs. By fixing the rules for the 
pooling of resources, the cooperation strategy becomes greater than the defection 
strategy, thus supporting the goal of maintaining the relationship. 
The most common principle to establish the sharing provisions is equity (Jap, 2001). 
This principle contributes to the quality of the relationship through its positive impact 
on satisfaction from the cooperating firms and through the perception of fair play that 
encourages the pursuit of the collaboration (Jap, 2001). 
- Relational governance 
Relational governance represents the inter-firm contact patterns, either withinthe individual 
organizations or at their interface with one another. Effective both at the organizational level 
and at the personal level, it is the combination of mechanisms that participate to (1) exchange 
information and (2) control the relationship. The relational governance mechanisms complete 
the contractual governance mechanisms in order to manage the interaction processes between 
the participants of the innovation cooperation relationship. 
(1) The information sharing mechanismsrefer to the information and knowledge 
exchange patterns both within and between cooperating firms. These mechanisms 
provide regulatory action (through tools and processes that enable the management of 
the relationship) and a sharing action (through the formal and informal dissemination 
of information such as meetings, publication of reports or emails). They have the 
capacity to positively impact performance of the relationship (Sluyts et al., 2011)by 
facilitating mutual learning and increasing effectiveness of the interactions. 
Nevertheless, if the repetition of contacts and projects within the relationship can lead 
to the multiplication of these mechanisms for the development of organizational 
routines specific to the dyad, it can also lead to performance loss of the relationship 
because of the increase of coordination costs. 
(2) The control mechanisms of the relationship refer to the mechanisms implemented 
to safeguard the interests of the dyad, which also includes the interests of each 
cooperating firms.Their role is to ensure the compliance of the contractual 
mechanismsandwith the policies and standards of each entity involved in the 
relationship.Their pivot is constituted by the assessment mechanisms which are 
followed by eventual adjustments to the governance mechanisms (Doz, 1996; Le Dain 
et al., 2011). But, as these adjustmentsto governance mechanisms span from the 
execution ofsafeguard provisions to less coercive influence strategies, they have the 
capacity to discourage or encourage cooperation.  
Thus, if the main objective of all of these governance mechanisms is to increase and sustain 
the effectiveness of the relationship, they also have the potential to encourage or discourage 
cooperation within this relationship. 
(P1) Relationship governance mechanisms impact the relationship performance. 
Over time, strategies and organizations of cooperating firms might vary because of changes in 
environments and staff, but also because of the new resources born from 
cooperation.Simultaneously, the iteration of contacts between firms promotes the installation 
of real organizational routines specific to the dyad, which also require adjustments in the 
governance of the relationship. Moreover, the capacity of each firm to adjust and to keep 
coherent operating mechanisms in place to manage the inter-firm relationship is seen as a 
cause of success or failure of the cooperation (Doz, 1996). 
(P2) The lack of adjustments in the relationship governance over time negatively 
impacts the relationship performance. 
During the life of collaborative projects, there may be several entities of each company 
involved in the relationship. As each entity might be in charge of different activities of their 
organization, it may have its own goals and interests (Doz, 1987) and therefore specific 
governance mechanisms and assessment standards. Since there is no consistency of 
governance mechanisms within a firm, as a result there is a risk of conflicting or chaotic 
interactions with the cooperating firmthat lower theoverall efficiencyof the relationship. 
Conversely, this can also lead to a commitment of the firm that might be superior to the 
original target. 
(P3) The consistency of each firm’s specific governance impacts the performance of the 
relationship. 
RELATIONSHIP LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT 
The term « relationship stage of development » refers to the evolution of an inter-firm 
relationship from its beginning. We consider that an innovation cooperation relationship can 
follow various levels of development. The development of such a relationship is not 
necessarily linear (Barnes, Naudéand Michell, 2007). It resultsfrom a continuous cycle of 
achievements, assessments and adjustments that leads either to an increased collaboration at 
each iteration, or a decreased collaboration (Doz, 1996; Ring and van de Ven, 1992). The 
transition from onelevel of development to another is possible on both ways. 
- The scale of development of the relationship 
We propose to study the development of the cooperative relationship of innovation as a 
development scale which four main levels are (0) discovery (1) exploration, (2) development 
and (3) stabilization. These four levels can be described as follows: 
(0) The discovery level is the stage where there is a "unilateral consideration of potential 
exchange partners" (Dwyer et al., 1987). 
(1) The exploration level means the engagement in discussion, negotiation and first 
interaction stage of the relationship (Dwyer et al., 1987; Kale and Singh, 2009; Lee 
and Johnsen, 2012). 
(2) The development level is characterized by increasing interactions, the development of 
a specific capability of collaboration and the reduction of the uncertainties linked to 
the relationship (Dwyer et al., 1987; Håkansson and IMP Project Group, 1982; Lee 
and Johnsen, 2012). 
(3) The stabilization level is the state of balance of contributions and powers in the 
relationship. This state allows a long-term mutual commitment of cooperating firms as 
it is based upon established trust and shared (Dwyer et al., 1987; Lee and Johnsen, 
2012). 
Each level of development corresponds to an increasing level of three key characteristics:(i) 
trust, (ii) interdependence and (iii) learning. 
- Three key characteristics of the development of the relationship 
(i) Trustrepresentseach cooperating firm’s confidence in the ability of the other to achieve the 
goals of the relationship and to act fairly, especially in case of possible opportunism (Zaheer 
et al., 1998). The establishment and the development of trust in a relationship lead to a 
reduction of conflict and facilitate inter-firm information and social exchanges. Thus, the 
more trust is important, the less need there is  for control mechanisms ( (Ring and van de Ven, 
1992). 
(ii) The notion of interdependence within a cooperationis based on the relative scarcity of 
alternative resources available externally to those available through the relationship (Thibaut 
and Kelley, 1959). For a cooperating firm,the more the dependence upon the other firm 
grows,the more its commitment to the relationship is important (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). 
This commitment is realizedthrough the implementation of dedicated mechanisms that 
distinguish this relationship from the others and secure it. 
(iii) The learnings within the dyad are the result of the information exchange between 
cooperating companies and the creation of knowledge born from inter-firminteractions. These 
learnings are impacting both the capability of the dyad to cooperate and to innovate. The 
better firms know each other, the less need there is for control mechanisms (Gulati, 1995) and 
the more governance mechanisms are adjusted to the relationship (Doz, 1996). Moreover, the 
increase of mutual learning can lead to an increase of joint projects and, consequently, new 
governance mechanisms. 
Thus, as these three characteristics influence the adjustment of governance mechanisms 
(Håkansson and IMP Project Group, 1982) and every level of development is characterized by 
a growing importance of these characteristics, we can hypothesize that 
(P4) Each level of development is related to a specific mix of governance mechanisms. 
When trust and interdependence positively impacts  thecooperation and commitment of 
cooperating firms in their relationship (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), the mutual 
learningspositively impact the efficiency of the cooperation (Doz, 1996; Sluyts et al., 2011), 
and is an objective of innovation cooperation.As the level of these three characteristics of the 
relationship development are related to the level of performance of innovation cooperation 
relationship: 
(P5) Each development level allows a growing level of relationship performance. 
TYPE OF INNOVATION 
Innovation is defined as "the implementation of a new or significantly improved product 
(good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in 
business practices, workplace organization or external relations"(OECD and Statistical 
Office of the European Communities, 2005). The type of innovation is applied to the main 
innovation projects or programs conducted in collaboration within the innovation cooperation 
relationship. It can be approached through the combination of the degree of change and 
novelty related to the project or program, and of the state of maturity of the innovation project 
that corresponds to the proximity of its implementation within the organization or in the 
market. 
- Extent of innovation 
The extent of innovation is the degree of novelty or change which the targeted innovation 
brings to the market and to the organizations. It can be approached through indicators such as 
the level of change (minor vs. major), the existence of the target market (client or application) 
and the estimated level of risk (high vs. low) (Kim, Kumar and Kumar, 2012). It is commonly 
assessed by a continuous classification form incremental to radical innovation. 
At the organizational level, the higher the extent of innovation, the more it involves to make 
changes from its knowledge to its operating modes (Johnsen, Calvi and Philips, 2012). When 
uncertainty about the feasibility of the innovation is high, there is a search for flexibility 
rather than control in the dyad, leading to the establishment of governance arrangements 
involving less commitments(Johnsen et al., 2012; van de Vrande, Vanhaverbekeand Duysters, 
2009). 
- Maturity of the innovation 
The type of innovation may also beevaluatedin terms of  the stage of development of the 
innovation project jointly conducted (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). As the innovation project is 
maturing, the activities and staff involved in the firms are changing (Johnsen et al., 2012). 
That leads to a change of both the expectations and the distribution of tasks within the dyad 
(Le Dain et al., 2011).Therefore, governance mechanisms related to the innovation project or 
program arecontinuously adapted to the maturity of running innovation projects or programs 
within the cooperation. 
(P6) The type of innovation of the joint innovation projects impacts the governance of 
the relationship. 
RELATIONSHIP PERFORMANCE 
Performance of innovation cooperation is based upon the completion of the relationship 
objectives, the quality of the utilization of the dyad’s resources in the context of the 
cooperation and the development of the relational rent. Le Dain et al. (2011) propose to 
evaluate the performance of innovation collaboration, at the firm level through factors of 
effectiveness, efficiency and proactivity. We suggest that the relationship performance might 
be assessed through these factors, adapted for evaluation at the dyad level: 
1. The effectiveness of the relationship corresponds to the satisfaction of the formal 
objectives of cooperation via the compliance with expected costs, delivery and quality 
but also via the meeting of objectives, such as the building of new or superior 
innovation capabilities. 
2. The efficiency of the relationship refers to the ability to use resources optimally – both 
at the firm levels and at the inter-firm level. 
3. The proactivity of the cooperating firms is linked to the level of a relational rent within 
the dyad,as it reflects the level of commitment of each firm in the cooperation through 
their ability anticipate the other’s needs, improve itself and deliver more than 
expected. 
These three factors cover all situations that may be encountered by companies involved in 
innovation cooperation (Le Dain et al., 2011) andprovide an image of the importance of the 
specific competitive advantage born from the innovation cooperation relationship. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This paper contributes to the comprehension of the elements that impact the performance of 
cooperative innovation considering it as a relationship. Our model and the propositions we 
suggest also contributes to the development of the consideration of these elements in the 
management of inter-firm relationshipswith collaborative innovation. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In order to empirically test our model, we propose to define the appropriate variables related 
to each of its four blocks as well as the methods of measurement. The unit of analysis will be 
dyadic, in line with the work of the IMP group. We propose to conduct this study through a 
survey with a large sample in order to perform analyses of correlation and sensitivity between 
the different elements of our model, as quantitative evidence can indicate relationships which 
may not be salient to the researcher (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Moreover, the evolution of organizations across the way from one level of development to 
another might be observed through longitudinal case studies conducted with dyads of 
independent firms in various industries. This will also allow us to add the impact of 
interpersonal relationships to the conceptual framework, which is of great importance in  
theinter-firm relationship  (Doz, 1987; Håkansson and Snehota, 1995; Zaheer et al., 1998). 
In addition, the model can be further detailed through the specification of the different 
governance mechanisms used and through the exploitation of the practices described in 
different fields of literature on alliances (Kale and Singh, 2009) andon Open Innovation(Van 
de Vrande et al., 2009).It would also be interesting to evaluate in our model whether the 
different families of innovation within the Oslo Manual (OECD and Statistical Office of the 
European Communities, 2005) differently impact the governance mechanisms.  
With this paper we contribute to the literature of open innovation offering a theoretical 
framework for further investigations intointer-firm cooperation within a dyadic unit of 
analysis. It might contribute to the balancing of studies between inbound and outbound open 
innovation, as there are more case studies on the internalization of innovation from outside the 
firm than on the outsourcing of innovation from the inside (Huizingh, 2011). 
It also contributes to the developing literature on early supplier involvement in new product 
development offering a relational view that adds a complementary vision of the relationship 
experience before and after the innovation project. 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
The model and the propositions made in this paper have three main implications for 
managers. Firstly, it helps to raise awareness among managers involved in innovation 
cooperation that relationship management is essential in order to get the best performance of 
an innovation cooperation;the managers must take into account all of the interactions between 
the two companies involved. These interactions involve all of the activities that occur within 
the relationship, not only those which are directly related to innovation project, but also those 
which are t related to, for example, the supply chain or to financial exchanges.  
Moreover, as the demand for the implementation of innovation projects increaseswhen it is 
not always the case for a number of potential innovation partners, it will be more and more 
important for a firm not to jeopardize its chances to renew collaborative innovation projects 
with the same company. Thus, in order to keep a sustainable innovation capacity a company 
must establish mechanisms that will ensure the performance of its collaboration quality, not 
only its interacting activities strictly related to innovation projects.  
These last two implications underline the interest of establishing within a firm some dedicated 
mechanisms that are similar to those established for privileged business partners such as key-
account clients, strategic suppliers and strategic alliance partners. 
Finally, the results of our research stand for the proposition that,for each level of development 
of the relationship, there will be a configuration of governance mechanisms that maximizes 
the performance of the relationship. Therefore, it is essential for practitioners to determine 
what that optimal configuration should be for their firm. Moreover, asnew innovation projects 
can disrupt the equilibrium of a relationship, it is important for managers to determine which 
mechanisms have to be implemented in order to undertake this project while maintaining a 
positive impact on the performance of the whole relationship. 
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